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T
o what extent may the court 
impose its own sense of justice 
when determining the parties 
beneÞ cial ownership of the family 
home? This is a question that was 
recently considered by the High Court 
in Jones v KernoĴ  [2009]. This case has 
conÞ rmed that a court can aĴ ribute to 
co-owners of a home an intention to 
vary their beneÞ cial interests that they 
had not actually expressed to each other, 
and impute to them an adjustment that 
would be fair and reasonable, taking 
into account the whole course
of dealings between them.
Facts of the case 
The parties (a cohabiting couple) 
had bought a house (39 Badger Hall 
Avenue) in joint names for £30,000.
The parties lived in the property for
11 years, until their relationship ended. 
It was not in dispute that the parties 
had held the beneÞ cial interest in the 
house in equal shares. The question for 
determination was whether, and if so to 
what extent, their respective interests 
had altered when Mr KernoĴ  leĞ , 
ceased to contribute to the mortgage 
and other outgoings, and bought his 
own property (114 Stanley Road), using 
his share of the proceeds from a life 
insurance policy he had held jointly 
with Ms Jones.
The Badger Hall Avenue property 
had been purchased with a deposit 
of £6,000 paid by Ms Jones and a 
mortgage, the repayments of which 
were initially shared. Mr KernoĴ  
subsequently built and paid for an 
extension to the house that increased 
its value signiÞ cantly (from £30,000 to 
£44,000). AĞ er he moved out, however, 
Ms Jones remained in the house for 
a further 15 years, paying all the 
mortgage instalments and outgoings 
during that time.
At Þ rst instance, the County Court 
judge held that, while the parties 
intentions at the outset might have 
been to provide them as a couple 
with a home, those intentions had 
changed, as Mr KernoĴ  had ignored 
the property since he moved out. The 
judge, therefore, held that the beneÞ cial 
interest should be split 90% to 10% in 
favour of Ms Jones, taking into account 
Mr KernoĴ s ability to aě ord his new 
accommodation by not contributing
to the Badger Hall Avenue property,
Ms Jones payment of the 20% deposit 
and preponderant contribution to the 
mortgage (81.5% of the total payments), 
and the lack of assistance from
Mr KernoĴ  in providing maintenance 
for their two children. In reaching 
this conclusion, the judge adopted the 
approach of considering what was fair 
and just between the parties. It was this 
aspect of the judges ruling that was 
challenged on appeal.
Imputing intention
and the notion of fairness
The primary issue before
Mr Nicholas Strauss QC (siĴ ing as 
a deputy judge of the High Court) 
was whether it was open to a court 
to consider what is fair in assessing 
the amount of a partys beneÞ cial 
entitlement to property. The reference 
in both Stack v Dowden [2007] and 
AbboĴ  v AboĴ  [2007] to the intentions 
of the parties being actual, inferred or 
imputed showed that it was certainly 
permissible for a judge to aĴ ribute to the 
parties a common intention that they did 
not have, or at least had not expressed 
to each other. But did this also allow 
the court to assess the quantum of each 
partys beneÞ cial interest by reference to 
a notion of fairness?
In Oxley v Hiscock [2004], Chadwick LJ 
(with whom Mance and ScoĴ  Baker LJJ 
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agreed) conÞ rmed the already-accepted 
view that, in determining a claim based 
on a constructive trust, the court is 
embarked on a two-stage assessment
of the claimants case.
The Þ rst stage involves the court 
asking whether there is evidence from 
which to raise a common intention that 
each party should have a beneÞ cial 
share in the property. If the parties had 
expressly discussed the maĴ er at the 
time of acquisition, that would give 
rise to the Þ rst category of common 
intention constructive trust recognised 
by Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset 
[1991]. Alternatively, where the maĴ er 
is not discussed at all, the requisite 
constructive trust could be inferred 
from the fact that each party had made a 
direct (or indirect) Þ nancial contribution: 
Lord Bridges second category.
Assuming that the common 
intention is present, the second stage 
involves the court assessing the extent 
of the parties respective beneÞ cial 
interests in the property. In some 
cases, if the parties have discussed 
the amount of their respective shares, 
this will be a straightforward task. 
Invariably, however, the parties will 
have said nothing about the actual 
proportions in which they should 
hold the property. In this laĴ er type of 
case, Chadwick LJ concluded that the 
amount of the parties respective shares 
would be what the court considered to 
be fair on the basis of all the relevant 
conduct. SigniÞ cantly, his Lordship 
emphasised that what the court was 
doing was supplying or imputing a 
common intention when the parties had 
not expressed that intention themselves 
(paragraph 66). The right question, 
therefore, in his view, was:
What would be a fair share for each 
party having regard to the whole course 
of dealing between them in relation to 
the property?
Interestingly, the rationale for the 
court in imputing a common intention 
in respect of the parties shares in this 
way is summarised by his Lordship as 
follows (at paragraph 71):
… if it were [the parties’] common 
intention that each should have some 
benefi cial interest in the property 
– which is the hypothesis upon which 
it becomes necessary to answer the 
second question – then, in the absence 
of evidence that they gave any thought 
to the amount of their respective shares, 
the necessary inference is that they must 
have intended that question would be 
answered later on the basis of what was 
then seen to be fair. (Emphasis added.)
In Stack, however, the House of 
Lords cast doubt on this approach. 
Baroness Hale (who gave the leading 
speech) felt that it was inappropriate 
for the court to impose its own view 
of what is fair, given that the correct 
approach (as explained in paragraph 
61) was to search for:
… the result which refl ects what the 
parties must, in the light of their 
conduct, be taken to have intended.
Lord Neuberger was more forceful 
on this point, suggesting that while 
an intention may be inferred as well 
as expressed it could not be imputed, 
since this would permit the court to 
aĴ ribute to the parties an intention 
which could not be deduced from their 
actions or statements, and which they 
did not have but were to be taken as 
having. To impute intention, in his 
view, would involve a judge in an 
exercise which was diĜ  cult, subjective 
and uncertain (paragraph 127). For this 
reason, fairness could not be a guiding 
principle.
Adopting these criticisms, the 
deputy judge in Jones concluded 
that the process of quantiÞ cation of 
beneÞ cial shares depended on an 
assessment of what, in the light of the 
parties conduct, they must be taken to 
have intended and not what the court 
itself considered to be fair or just. Some 
element of imputation, however, was 
inevitable where there was no evidence 
at all of the parties actual intentions. 
This did not mean that the court could 
override the intention of the parties 
in favour of what the court itself 
considered fair. The crucial point
was that the court could not impose 
its own view in the face of what the 
parties had said or from their conduct. 
In the words of the deputy judge (at 
paragraph 31):
To the extent that the intention of the 
parties cannot be inferred, the court is 
free… to impute a common intention 
to the parties. Imputing an intention 
involves, as Lord Neuberger points out, 
attributing to the parties an intention 
which they did not have, or at least did 
express [sic] to each other. The intention 
is one which the parties ‘must be taken’ 
to have had.
In the deputy judges view, the 
process of assessment simply could 
not work without the court supplying 
what it considered to be fair where 
the evidence of the parties intention 
cannot be found from their own words 
or conduct. In these circumstances, as 
stated at paragraph 31:
… the only available criterion by which 
to assess the extent of the alteration 
is what is objectively fair, and the only 
available judge of that is the court. 
SigniÞ cantly, in Jones, the County 
Court judge had not overridden any 
diě erent intention that, from their 
words or conduct, could reasonably 
have been aĴ ributed to the parties. 
Thus, his approach could be justiÞ ed
as being in accordance with the 
common intention of the parties. 
Alternatively, it could be justiÞ ed as
the only option available to the court
on quantiÞ cation.
Ambulatory trust
The possibility of altered intentions 
arising from subsequent events gives 
rise to the notion that the constructive 
trust in this context is ß oating or 
ambulatory and not Þ xed at the date of 
acquisition of the property. To produce 
a change in beneÞ cial ownership, 
however, the claimant must in most 
cases point to evidence involving 
In Jones v Kernott, the deputy judge acknowledged 
that a trust may be ambulatory and that the intentions 
of the parties as regards their benefi cial interests may 
change (or be taken to have changed) over time.
T&E111 p04-06 Pawlowski.indd   5 29/10/2009   17:38:45
6 Trusts and Estates Law & Tax Journal November 2009
CO-OWNERSHIP
discussions or actions subsequent to 
acquisition from which an agreement 
or common understanding as to such a 
change can be inferred.
In Stack, the House of Lords referred 
to the carrying out of signiÞ cant 
improvements to the home as justifying 
an adjustment of beneÞ cial ownership. 
The cost of such improvements would 
be seen as capital expenditure that 
diě ers from regular outgoings. The 
work, however, would have to be 
substantial, so decoration or repairs 
would generally be excluded. The 
making of repayments on the mortgage 
was also seen as a potential factor 
inß uencing the adjustment of the 
parties beneÞ cial shares following 
acquisition. Substantial repayments 
of capital would have this eě ect, but 
payments of mortgage interest may 
also be considered in appropriate cases.
The deputy judge in Jones 
acknowledged that a trust may be 
ambulatory and that the intentions of 
the parties as regards their beneÞ cial 
interests may change (or be taken
to have changed) over time. The
correct approach, as suggested by
Lord Neuberger in Stack, was to 
consider Þ rst what the initial intention 
was and then to examine whether it 
had altered, and if so to what extent.
Whole course of dealing
between the parties
It was signiÞ cant that the parties in 
Jones, as in Stack, had maintained 
separate Þ nances following Mr KernoĴ s 
departure from the Badger Hall Avenue 
property. It was, therefore, correct to 
infer that the parties no longer intended 
equal beneÞ cial ownership. What 
diě erent intention, however, fell to 
be imputed to the parties, given that 
they had not shown any indication of 
their intentions as to their respective 
beneÞ cial shares?
In the absence of any indication by 
words or conduct as to how the shares 
should be altered, the appropriate 
criterion, as discussed above, was what 
the court considered to be fair and just 
in all the circumstances. Following 
this approach, the most signiÞ cant 
direct contribution to the value of the 
Badger Hall Avenue property was the 
initial 20% deposit paid by Ms Jones 
on acquisition. There was also the 
very substantial capital gain on both 
properties. By not contributing to the 
outgoings at Badger Hall Avenue aĞ er 
his departure, Mr KernoĴ  was able to 
buy another property on which there 
was almost as great a capital gain. 
According to the deputy judge at 
paragraph 51:
It would not be reasonable for Mr Kernott 
to have, and the parties cannot be taken 
to have intended that he should have,
a signifi cant part of the increased value 
of Badger Hall Avenue, in addition to
the whole of the capital gain from 
Stanley Road.
It would, therefore, be unreasonable 
for him to retain more than only a 
small interest in Badger Hall Avenue. 
Although Mr KernoĴ  had made 
substantial improvements to the 
property, his failure to contribute 
maintenance to his children was also
a relevant factor that could properly
be taken into account in the assessment. 
Looking at the whole course of dealing 
between the parties, the deputy judge 
concluded that the 90% aĴ ribution to 
Ms Jones determined by the County 
Court judge was well within the
range of fairness.
Conclusion for trusts
and estates practitioners 
The decision in Jones provides very 
useful guidance on how the court is to 
assess beneÞ cial entitlement where the 
evidence does not disclose what the 
parties intended. The criterion of fairness 
comes into play in these circumstances 
only as a means of supplying the 
missing elements and not as a means of 
undermining the parties intentions in 
so far as they may be apparent. What 
the court cannot do is disregard the 
evidence of what the parties probably 
intended and substitute what it might 
consider to be fair. That would be to 
enter into what Lord Neuberger called 
the forbidden territories of subjectivity 
and uncertainty.
The re-introduction of the concept
of fairness in this limited way is, in
my view, both eminently sensible
and practical. As Chadwick LJ observed 
in Oxley (see above), in the absence
of any indication from the parties
own words or conduct as to their 
intentions regarding the quantum of 
their beneÞ cial ownership, the only 
recourse leĞ  to the court is to undertake 
its own assessment of what the parties 
must have intended by reference to 
what is fair and reasonable. In the 
words of the deputy judge in Jones (at 
paragraph 35):
It is diffi cult to see what intention could 
then be imputed to the parties other than 
that each should have his or her fair share 
in the light of all the circumstances. If that 
were to be disregarded, there would be no 
way in many cases of resolving the issue.
Moreover, to impute an intention in 
this way simply accords with what the 
parties must have understood would 
be the outcome, given the absence of 
any indication on their part as to what 
their respective beneÞ cial shares are to 
be. In such cases, as pointed out by the 
deputy judge at paragraph 33:
… their actual or subconscious intention 
may well be that their respective 
shares… should be whatever the court 
decides is fair in all the circumstances.
To suggest, therefore, that 
considerations of fairness should 
be excluded in such circumstances 
is to deny the parties the liberty of 
assuming that fairness will be relevant 
in determining their eventual interests 
where they have failed to clarify their 
intentions themselves.
The signiÞ cance of Jones, however, 
goes beyond the facts of the case, since
it clearly acknowledges that now there
is really no diě erence in analysis between 
constructive trust and proprietary 
estoppel in cases of this kind. In each, 
the court is supplying (or imputing) 
a common intention as to the parties 
beneÞ cial entitlement on the basis of
a notion of fairness (or doing justice to
the parties) in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances: see Yaxley v GoĴ  [2000]
at 180, per Robert Walker LJ.  ■
AbboĴ  v AboĴ 
[2007] UKPC 53
Jones v KernoĴ 
[2009] EWHC 1713 (Ch)
(To be reported in a future edition 
of Wills and Trusts Law Reports)
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